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Consider a population of citizens uniformly spread over the entire plane, that faces a 
problem of locating public facilities to be used by its members. The cost of every 
facility is financed  by its users, who also face an idiosyncratic private access cost to the 
facility. We assume that the facilities’ cost is independent of location and access costs 
are linear with respect to the Euclidean distance. We show that an external intervention 
that covers 0.19% of the facility cost is sufficient to guarantee secession-proofness or 
no cross-subsidization, where no group of individuals is charged more than its stand 
alone cost incurred if it had acted on its own. Moreover, we demonstrate that in this 
case the Rawlsian access pricing is the only secession-proof allocation. 
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Consider a society that faces a problem of locating one or several public facilities (or public
projects as in Mas-Colell, 1980) to serve its members. The facilities, say libraries, are to be located
on the plane and could be visited by citizens at some private “transportation” cost related to distance
between their residence and the facility they are assigned to. Assuming that setting up and operating
a facility entails a ﬁxed set-up and operational cost, the following problems arise:
• how many facilities should be built;
• where to locate the facilities;
• how to assign citizens to the facilities;
• how to allocate the facilities costs (in the form of access fees) to citizens-users.
In this paper we examine the case where
- the demand for use of services is uniformly distributed over the plane, independently of the cost of
services;
- the cost of setting up a facility is independent of location;
- transportation cost is proportional to Euclidean distance.
We assume that for any number and location of facilities, assignment of users to facilities and
access fees, all citizens-users enjoy a “free entry” option: any group can build a new facility for
their own beneﬁt at the standard ﬁxed cost, and locate it at will. A threat of free entry leads us
imperatively to impose the “secession-proofness” or “core” property: at equilibrium, no group of
users should be able to beneﬁt by seceding from the proposed arrangement to set up and operate its
own facility.1 The secession-proofness also can be considered as a “no cross-subsidization” condition
where no group of users is required to contribute more than its stand-alone cost. In other words, the
equilibrium cost allocation should ensure the voluntary participation of any group of citizens.
The secession-proofness immediately yields the total cost minimization requirement: the society
should minimize the total burden of setting up and operating of all facilities and of the aggregate
1Since a geographical area served by a public facility can be identiﬁed as a political jurisdiction, the secession-
proofness could then be viewed as a requirement of political stability.
2access fees of all citizens. This requirement, in turn, leads to two simple but important observations:
(i) since the facilities costs are location-independent, every group of citizens assigned to the same
facility should place it at the “central” location that minimizes the aggregate transportation costs
of that group;2 (ii) every citizen should be assigned to the facility closest to her residence. These
observations allow us to reduce the societal problem described above to ﬁnding a partition of the
society into disjoint groups of users (called jurisdictions hereafter) that, under (i) and (ii), satisﬁes
the total cost minimization requirement. Any such partition will be called eﬃcient.
The characterization of eﬃcient partitions in this geometric setting is a well-documented problem
in mathematics. An eﬃcient partition consists of identical regular hexagons,3 whose size is calculated
as a function of the ratio of ﬁxed costs per facility to access or transportation costs per unit of
distance. However, the area over which total costs per user are minimized is not a hexagon but a
disk! Since the plane cannot be partitioned into disks, it helps to explain the ﬁrst result of this paper
that demonstrates that the set of secession-proof allocations is empty. This simply means that it is
impossible to allocate facilities’ cost over hexagons in eﬃcient partition in order to rule out a threat
of secession by all disk-shaped jurisdictions.
The non-existence of secession-proof allocations implies that the stability can be ensured only at
some cost. We consider the situation where an external source is willing to ﬁnance a fraction δ of the
total cost incurred by jurisdictions if they follow the prescribed agreement. Suppose that the total
costs (set-up plus operation plus access fees) for the jurisdiction-to-be at the proposed equilibrium
are subject to the discount factor 1−δ, whereas forming a new jurisdiction to set up and operate an
independent facility requires a full non-subsidized cost. Then the allocation will be δ-secession-proof
if the savings reaped by the seceding jurisdiction fall short of the subsidy obtained by members of
that jurisdiction at the proposed access fee allocation.
We then turn to the examination of the minimal subsidy that can rectify stability failure. By
using Fubini’s theorem, we demonstrate that the set of δ-secession-proof allocations is non-empty
if and only if the value of the subsidy, δ is no less than the threshold δ∗ ≈ 0.0019. This value is
2It is easy to see that such a location is uniquely deﬁned for every group of citizens.
3See discussion below.
3actually determined by the ratio 1−δ∗ of total per capita costs to users in an optimal disk and in a
optimal hexagon. A tiny value of δ∗ (less than 0.2%) lends credence to the δ-secession-proofness as
a stability concept.
The second result of the paper is the characterization of the δ∗-secession-proof allocations. It is
provided by the so-called Rawls principle that requires the minimization of the total cost incurred by
the least privileged citizen-user and produces the complete equalization of total cost for all citizens-
users. A transparent characterization of that principle requires to subject access to a fee that
declines linearly with the residence-to-facility distance and to adjust access fees so that operators of
the facilities break even.
The Rawls principle deﬁnes uniquely the δ∗-secession-proof allocation. (For higher values of δ,
the set of δ-secession-proof allocations contains other allocations as well.) The Rawlsian policies are
often advocated on the basis of justice considerations, whereas our result oﬀers a stability argument
in support of the Rawls principle.
Related Literature. To the best of our knowledge, the related literature in economics deals
almost exclusively with the uni-dimensional case. Cremer, de Kerchove and Thisse (1985), Alesina
and Spolaore (1997) examine the existence of secession-proof allocations in the case where the pop-
ulation is uniformly spread over a bounded interval and the unique cost share rule available for each
jurisdiction is the equal-share scheme, according to which all citizens in the same jurisdiction are
subject to an identical access fee. Casella (2001) studies a model where individuals are uniformly
distributed over the circle. Le Breton and Weber (2003) and Haimanko, Le Breton and Weber
(2004) address the existence and characterization of secession-proof access fee allocations in the case
of general distributions. Bogomolnaia et al. (2005a,b) examine the issue of secession-proof alloca-
tions under various notions of stability. Dr` eze, Le Breton and Weber (2005) prove that the Rawlsian
distribution is the unique secession-proof allocation in the case where the population is uniformly
spread over the entire real line. Thus, in the uni-dimensional setting δ∗ is equal to zero and there
is no gap between eﬃciency and optimality so that an eﬃcient partition consists of optimal-size
4intervals. Notice also that our set-up is that of “horizontal diﬀerentiation” where individuals display
distinct preferences over geographical locations of public facilities. This is in contrast to the “vertical
diﬀerentiation” framework, where individuals exhibit identical preferences over quantity or quality
attributes of public projects.4
The paper is organized as follows. The next section contains the model and introduces the needed
deﬁnitions. The main results, whose proofs are relegated to the Appendix, are stated in Section 3.
2 The Model
We consider a society with a continuum of individuals that has to determine a partition into
multiple groups (jurisdictions). Each jurisdiction has to be assigned a public facility accessible to its
members and an allocation of access fees to share the facility cost among them. The facilities will
be located in a multi-dimensional space:
Assumption A.1 — Multidimensionality: The space of facilities’ locations is the two-dimensional
Euclidean space X = <2.
Citizens have idiosyncratic preferences (or transportation costs) over possible facilities they could
be assigned to. We assume that for every individual the transportation cost is represented by the
Euclidean distance from her residence to the facility in her jurisdiction:
Assumption A.2 — Euclidean transportation costs: For every individual located at l = (l1,l2) ∈
X, her accession cost to every t = (t1,t2) ∈ X is given by
||t − l|| =
p
|t1 − l1|2 + |t2 − l2|2. (1)
This formalization allows us to identify an individual with her location and to characterize the society
by the distribution of individuals’ locations. We assume that the citizens are uniformly distributed
over the entire space X:
4See e.g., Westhoﬀ (1977), Guesnerie and Oddou (1981, 1988), Wooders (1978, 1980), Guesnerie (1995), Weber and
Zamir (1985), Greenberg and Weber (1986), J´ ehiel and Scotchmer (1997, 2001), Konishi, Le Breton and Weber (1998).
5Assumption A.3 — Uniform distribution: The citizens’ distribution is given by the two-dimensional
Lebesgue measure5 λ over <2.
The area of a measurable6 set S will be denoted by λ(S), i.e., λ(S) =
R
S
dt. In what follows, the
null-measured sets with λ(S) = 0 will be disregarded, so that the qualiﬁcation “up to a null-set”
should be added to almost all our results.
In our set-up, every jurisdiction is a measurable bounded subset of X with positive measure.
The collection of such sets will be denoted by M(X). We assume that the cost of each facility is
independent of its location and consists of a ﬁxed cost, independent of the size of a jurisdiction, and
a variable operational cost proportional to the jurisdiction size:
Assumption A.4 — Facility cost: For a facility assigned to a jurisdiction, the cost is given by
f(S) = g + αλ(S), (2)
where g > 0,α ≥ 0 are two constants.
We now formally introduce the notion of a partition of a measurable subset S ⊂ X:
Deﬁnition 2.1: A partition P of a (possibly inﬁnite-measured) set S is a jurisdiction structure that
consists of sets from M(X) which are “almost” pairwise disjoint: λ(T
T
T0) = 0 for all T 6= T0
in P, and whose union covers the entire set S:
S
T∈P T = S. The set of partitions of S is
denoted by P(S). Obviously, if the measure of S is inﬁnite, then every P ∈ P(S) consists of
an inﬁnite number of jurisdictions.
Now let us turn to the determination of facility choices. For each S ∈ M(X) and a location l ∈ X




||t − l||dt. (3)
5See Halmos (1950), p. 153.
6A subset of X is measurable if its intersection with every measurable subset of a ﬁnite measure is measurable;
hence, we allow for inﬁnite-measured measurable subsets.
6In what follows, the eﬃciency requires that the facility location in each jurisdiction S would
minimize the total transportation cost of its members. That is, each jurisdiction S is assigned to the




The value of this problem is called “MAT(S)” (Minimal Aggregate Transportation cost of the set
S).7 A solution to (??) is called a central location of T.8 We use the following lemma:
Lemma 2.2: For every jurisdiction S ∈ M(X), the central location, denoted by m(S), is unique.9
Lemma 2.2 resolves the issue of an eﬃcient facility location choice for every jurisdiction. Thus, we
denote by D(S) the aggregate transportation cost of members of S:
D(S) = D(S,m(S)). (5)
Every measurable set S ⊂ X can be partitioned into several jurisdictions. We deﬁne the stand alone
average total cost10 in S as the minimum over all possible partitions P of S:
K (S) = inf
P
P




Deﬁnition 2.3: A partition P is S-eﬃcient if it is a solution to (??). An X-eﬃcient partition will
be simply called an eﬃcient partition.
From now on, we will focus our analysis on eﬃcient partitions. The characterization of eﬃcient
partitions in our geometric setting is a well documented problem in mathematics. The qualitative
result (re)discovered by many authors states that there is a unique “shape” of eﬃcient partitions
which consists of identical regular hexagons.11 We have:
7A solution to this problem exists. Indeed, the integral in (??) is continuous in l, and for l → ∞ the value of the
program goes to +∞.
8Note that in the unidimensional setting, for every bounded set T, a location is central if and only if it is a median
of T.
9This result is essentially multi-dimensional: obviously, in the unidimensional setting a set may have a continuum
of central points.
10Since the total cost for an inﬁnite-measured set is inﬁnite, in this case we will take a limit of the sequence of sets
that uniformly approach S.
11See Fejes Toth (1953), Haimovich and Magnanti (1988), Morgan and Bolton (2002), as well as Christaller (1933),
L¨ osch (1954), Bollobas and Stern (1972), and Stern (1972) in the economic geography context.
7Result 2.4: Partition P is eﬃcient if and only if it is comprised of identical regular hexagons, whose
stand-alone value is minimal among all regular hexagons.
The size of hexagons in eﬃcient partitions obviously depends upon the value of the ﬁxed component
of facility costs: the smaller the cost, the smaller are jurisdictions in an eﬃcient partition. The size
of “eﬃcient” hexagons is explicitly derived in the Appendix.
Let us turn to the examination of accession fees. In every potential jurisdiction S ∈ M(X), a
sharing rule y is a measurable function on S that speciﬁes accession fees of members of S, if this
jurisdiction forms. We impose the budget-balancedness condition:




y(t)dt = f(S). (7)
It would be useful to consider the notion of consistent sharing rule. Since the whole plane is
partitioned into identical (hexagonal) jurisdictions, it makes sense to demand that the individuals
in identical locations within diﬀerent jurisdictions bear the same costs. We impose a weak form of
consistency that requires that any two individuals in any two diﬀerent jurisdictions, whose location
is identical with respect to their corresponding central points, are assigned the same accession fees.12
Assumption A.6 — Consistent sharing rule: For every eﬃcient partition P∗, every two diﬀer-
ent (hexagonal) jurisdictions H,H0 ∈ P∗ and every two individuals t ∈ H,t0 ∈ H0 satisfying
t − m(S) = t0 − m(S0), we have y(t) = y(t0).
The sharing rule y associated with partition P∗ determines the following cost allocation for any
individual t ∈ X
c(t) = y(t) + ||t − m(Ht)||, (8)
where Ht ∈ P∗ is the hexagon in P∗ that contains t and m(Ht) is its center.
We will now ﬁx one of the (fully equivalent to each other) eﬃcient partitions, say P∗. The cost
sharing rule chosen by the society satisﬁes a requirement of voluntary participation when no group
12This assumption simpliﬁes calculus of the proof, while it is not essential for the main result.
8of individuals should contribute more than the cost incurred if it had acted on its own. Thus, the
formation of jurisdictions and the allocation of accession fees within each of them rules out the
emergence of a potentially seceding group that can beneﬁt all its members. Formally,






c(t)dt > K(S). (9)
A cost allocation c is secession-proof if no set S ∈ M(X) is prone to secession. The set of
secession-proof cost allocations on X will be denoted by A.
The next deﬁnition introduces the allocations that satisfy the Rawls principle that requires the
minimization of the total cost of the most disadvantaged individual in each jurisdiction. It implies
the cost equalization across the entire society:
Deﬁnition 2.6: A cost allocation r is called Rawlsian if the value r(t) is constant within each
H ∈ P∗, and, hence, on X. That is, for every t,t0 ∈ X we have r(t) = r(t0).
3 Results
We are now in position to state the main results of the paper. First, we demonstrate that under
our assumptions, a secession-proof allocation fails to exist.
Proposition 3.1: Suppose that assumptions A.1-A.6 hold. Then the set of secession-proof alloca-
tions A is empty.
In absence of secession-proof allocations, we will turn to the search for a solution which is the
“closest” to be secession-proof. For instance, we may assume that there is a ﬁxed per capita secession
cost for any subgroup S ⊂ X; alternatively, one can consider government intervention to subsidizes a
certain fraction of the total cost of every citizen to prevent the formation of groups prone to secession.
Both approaches are essentially equivalent and yield the following deﬁnition of δ-secession-proofness:
Deﬁnition 3.2: Let δ > 0 be given. A cost allocation c is δ-secession-proof if for all S ∈ M(X) the
following inequality holds:
(1 − δ)c(S) ≤ K(S). (10)
9The set of δ-secession-proof allocations for X will be denoted by A(δ).
In other words, if individuals follow the prescribed agreement, then the δ-part of their total cost is
covered “from outside”. If, however, a jurisdiction wants to secede, then its members will have to
bear costs on their own.
This deﬁnition relaxes the constraints which determine secession-proof allocations and, obviously,
if δ is large enough the set A(δ) is nonempty. Moreover, if A(δ) is nonempty for some δ, it is also
the case for all δ0 > δ. This allows us to to state the existence of a threshold value δ∗ deﬁned by
δ∗ = inf{δ > 0| A(δ) 6= ∅}. (11)
It will be shown that the set A(δ∗) is itself nonempty. The value δ∗ therefore can represent the cost
of stability, which is the minimal per-capita subsidy which sustains secession-proofness. We can now
state our main result:
Proposition 3.3: Under Assumptions A.1-A.6,
(i) δ∗ ≈ 0.0019;
(ii) The set A(δ∗) is a singleton which consists of the Rawlsian allocation.
That is, the cost of stability δ∗ is very small. Moreover, the only δ∗-secession-proof allocation
is Rawlsian.
The statement of this proposition requires some explanation. Consider a hexagon H, which is an
element of an eﬃcient partition. Obviously, this hexagon is not optimal in terms of per capita cost




In fact, no hexagon represents a solution for (??), and, unsurprisingly, jurisdictions with the minimal
per capita total cost are disks. Denote by K(B) the value of the problem in (??). We then show
that the cost of stability δ∗ is given by




10which is obviously positive since K(B) < K(H). Thus, the cost gap between an eﬃcient hexagon
and an optimal disk necessitates government intervention and subsidization of eﬃcient partitions.
It is important to point out that this feature does not appear in the uni-dimensional setting where
eﬃcient and optimal jurisdictions are intervals of the same size and the stability cost is equal to zero
(see Dr` eze, Le Breton and Weber (2005)).
In order to provide an intuition for the result that the Rawlsian allocation is a unique δ∗-secession-
proof allocation, consider a secession-proof allocation c. Under c the total costs over every optimal-
sized disk should be the same, or else there would exist a disk-shaped potential jurisdiction whose
members’ total burden exceeds their stand-alone cost. Take a set S which “almost” coincides with an
optimal disk. Speciﬁcally, let S be a subset of the disk B with the optimal radius l∗ which contains
a disk B0 with the same center and a smaller radius l∗ − γ, where γ is a small positive number. It
turns out that the diﬀerence between total per capita cost over the sets S and B under the allocation
c is represented by the second degree term with respect to γ. Thus, in a thin ring inscribed into an
optimal disk B, the measure of agents whose total cost is smaller than the average is “negligible”.
Since such a ring could be chosen arbitrarily thin, and the collection of such rings covers the entire
plane, we conclude that the measure of the citizens whose cost is less than the society average is
zero. Thus, c must satisfy the Rawls principle.
4 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2.2: Let S ∈ M(X) be given and assume that S has two diﬀerent central




. Obviously m and m0 are central points of S0 as well and D(S) = D(S0). Then for




||t − m|| + ||t − m0||

> ||t − ¯ m|| (14)
and, since λ(S) = λ(S0) > 0, this implies that
Z
S0













11However, by (??) and (??), the right-hand side of (??) is equal to D(S) = D(S0), a contradiction to
m and m0 being central points of S0. 2
Before proceeding with the proof of Propositions 3.1 and 3.3, we need a notation to state some
preliminary results. Without loss of generality, we shall assume, that the variable component of
facility costs α in Assumption A.4 is equal to zero.
Lemma A.1: A set S is a solution of (??) if and only if S is a disk of the radius l∗, where the value










Moreover, the per capita cost, K(B), in such a disk is equal to l∗.
Denote by Bl
a the disk with the center at a ∈ X and the radius l > 0. The disk of the optimal size
l∗ and center a will be referred to as simply Ba. Denote the disk of radius l > 0 with the center at
m(S) by Bl.
Proof: Take a set S that solves (??). It is easy to see that there exist two nonnegative numbers
l1,l2 with 0 ≤ l1 ≤ l2 < ∞ such that both Bl1 \S and S \Bl2 are null-sets, and two sets, Bl \S and
S \ Bl, have a positive measure for all l ∈ (l1,l2). We claim that l1 = l2, i.e., S = Bl1 = Bl2.
If not, take l3 = (2l1 + l2)/3 and l4 = (l1 + 2l2)/3. Then both λ(S \ Bl4) and λ(Bl3 \ S) are
positive numbers. Shift a positive mass of individuals from S \ Bl4 to Bl3 \ S to guarantee that the




||p − m(˜ S)||dp ≤
Z
˜ S
||p − m(S)||dp < D(S), (17)
a contradiction to S being a solution of (??).


















12yielding the minimal average cost K(B) = l∗.2
We will utilize the lemma that evaluates the average cost of jurisdictions that are “close” to
optimal disks:




a , i.e. B
l∗−γ
a ⊂ S ⊂ Bl∗
a . Then K(S), the aggregate average cost
over S, diﬀers from the aggregate average cost over optimal disk K(B) only in the second order
term:
K(S) < l∗ +
4
l∗γ2. (19)





a . In our derivations below we take into account that the total
transportation cost within S (weakly) increases if we replace the m(S) by a, and that the distance
between any point in ˜ S to a is bounded from above by l∗. Denote z =
3
π














a ) + l∗λ(˜ S)
λ(B
l∗−γ
a ) + λ(˜ S)
=
(l∗)3 + 2(l∗ − γ)3 + zl∗
3(l∗ − γ)2 + z
<
3(l∗)3 − 6(l∗)2γ + 6l∗γ2 + zl∗
3(l∗ − γ)2 + z
=
3l∗(l∗ − γ)2 + zl∗
3(l∗ − γ)2 + z
+
3l∗γ2































Proof: Consider a regular hexagon Hl, where l denotes the distance between the center m(Hl) and
























































Since the area of Hl is 2
√

















which attains its minimum at the eﬃcient hexagon H, i.e., when












It is easy to verify that then the per capita average cost K(H) = K(H˜ l) is given by (??) which at
the same time represents the average cost of the whole plane X under an eﬃcient partition. 2
Take the eﬃcient partition P∗ of X. For every positive integer N, consider a subset GN of P∗
that consists of N2 adjacent hexagons (see Figure 1). Let the sequence {GN}N=1,...,∞ be nested,
i.e., each GN is imbedded into GN+2 “symmetrically”, such that the set GN+2 \GN is a “hexagonal



























































Figure 1a. Hexagonal rectangular Figure 1b. Hexagonal ring
GN for N = 3 GN+2 \ GN for N = 2
Figure 1. Hexagonal rectangular and hexagonal ring
14We have the following result:
Lemma A.4: For every a ∈ GN, the disk Ba is contained in GN+2.
Proof: Denote by ¯ l the side of a hexagon in partition P∗. Since the minimal width of the hexagonal




˜ l, where ˜ l is the distance
between the center of the eﬃcient hexagon and the middle point of one of its sides, which has been
















which, by (??), exceeds the value l∗. 2
Let the eﬃcient partition P∗ be endowed with the sharing rule y, that generates cost allocation
c, and H is a (hexagonal) jurisdiction in P∗. Denote by λH the Lebesgue measure of H and by λB
the Lebesgue measure of an optimal disk.
For every a ∈ X denote by the value ϕ(a) the aggregated cost incurred by the members of the
disk Ba:




Deﬁne ¯ ϕ as the aggregated cost incurred by the allocation c on all disks of optimal size whose centers





Note that, due to the consistency assumption A.6, the value ¯ ϕ is invariant to a choice of a hexagon
in P∗. We need the following result:
Lemma A.5:




Proof: Deﬁne the function Ψ(a,t) on GN × GN+2 ⊂ <4 by
Ψ(a,t) =

c(t), if t ∈ Ba;
0, otherwise.
(29)
15We will integrate the function Ψ(a,t) over the set GN × GN+2. According to Fubini’s theorem
(Halmos (1950), p.148), two diﬀerent orders of integration yield the same result. First, we integrate


























ϕ(a)da = N2 ¯ ϕ. (30)
Before integrating in the reverse order, note that the following duality property
{a|t ∈ Ba} ≡ Bt (31)
holds for every t ∈ X. This is a simple consequence of the symmetry of the distance ||t − p|| as a
function of two arguments, and the circle Bt being the set of points p for which ||p−t|| = ||t−p|| ≤ l∗.



















































λBc(t)dt = (N − 2)2I. (35)
Fubini’s theorem allows us to rewrite (??) as
N2 ¯ ϕ = (N − 2)2I + LN = N2I + LN − 4(N − 1)I. (36)
Let us estimate the absolute value of the last two terms. Since for any t ∈ GN+2, hence, for any











c(t)da = λBc(t), it follows that
|LN −4(N −1)I| ≤ |LN|+4(N −1)I ≤ 4(N −1)I+
Z
GN+2\GN−2
λBc(t)dt = (12N −4)I < 12NI. (37)
16Thus,




Since N can be made arbitrarily large, it immediately yields the desired equality ¯ ϕ = I.2
Proof of Proposition 3.1: It is a corollary of Proposition 3.3.
Proof of Proposition 3.3: Let us show ﬁrst that




which, by Lemmas A.1 and A.3, can be calculated as













We will demonstrate that the set of δ-secession-proof allocations is empty if and only if δ < δ∗.
Consider a δ-secession-proof allocation c. The budget balancedness assumption A.5 implies that
the value of I, determined by (??), is equal to λBλHK(H), and by Lemma A.4. so is the value of ¯ ϕ.
Hence, there exists a ∈ H such that ϕ(a) ≥ λBK(H). On the other hand, the stand alone aggregate
cost in Ba is λBK(B). Since c is δ-secession-proof, Deﬁnition 3.2 implies that (1 − δ)λBK(H) ≤




Let us show that Rawlsian allocation is δ-secession-proof whenever δ ≥ δ∗. Indeed, since r(t) =
K(H) for every t ∈ X, then for S = Bl∗
— an optimal disk we observe that (1 − δ)K(H) ≤ K(B).
Now, for any S ∈ M(X) we have K(S) ≥ K(B) and therefore (1 − δ)K(H) ≤ K(B) ≤ K(S).
To complete the proof of the proposition, it remains to demonstrate that the Rawlsian allocation
(which assigns every individual in X the access fee of K(H)) is the only δ∗-secession-proof. For this
end, consider an arbitrary δ∗-secession-proof allocation c(·) and estimate the number of individuals
whose access fee is “substantially” below the level K(H).
Take a positive number ε > 0. Consider ﬁrst an arbitrary ring Ba \ B
l∗−γ
a and evaluate the
measure of individuals t whose cost c(t) satisﬁes c(t) < K(H) − ε. Denote this set by U, and
17consider the set S = Ba \ U, for which, by Lemma A.2, we have K(S) < l∗ +
4
l∗γ2. On the other
hand,
c(S) = c(Bl∗
) − c(U) ≥ λBK(H) − λ(U)K(H) + λ(U)ε = λ(S)K(H) + λ(U)ε. (41)
The δ∗-secession-proofness of c(·) implies that the average per capita cost in group S, adjusted




= (1 − δ∗)(K(H) +
λ(U)
λ(S)
ε) ≤ K(S) < l∗ +
4
l∗γ2. (42)







γ2 = Wγ2, (43)
where W is a constant independent of γ.
Now consider the rectangular Q with sides of 2l∗ and l∗ centered at the origin. For any small
positive number γ, denote by R[i,γ] the ring Bpi \ B
l∗−γ
pi centered at the point pi = (iγ,0), where












Indeed, it is easy to see that ∀x ∈ Q there exist at least one i such that x ∈ Bpi, and at least one j
such that x / ∈ Bpj. Hence, there exist such i and j = i ± 1 that the two statements
x ∈ Bpi; x / ∈ Bpj (45)
hold simultaneously. As obviously B
l∗−γ














respectively, who incur the cost less than K(H) − ε under the allocation c. By utilizing (??), we
have λ(Ui) ≤ W
(l∗)2










18Since N can be chosen arbitrarily large, (??) implies that λ(U) = 0. Note that this argument
actually implies that for any rectangular with the sides of 2l∗ and l∗, the Lebesgue measure of the
set of individuals who incur the cost less than l∗ − ε under the allocation c has the zero measure.
Finally, consider an arbitrary hexagon H in the eﬃcient partition P∗. It is contained in the union
of several rectangulars with the sides of 2l∗ and l∗. Hence, the measure of the set of individuals in
H whose cost is less than K(H) − ε is zero. But the set of individuals in H who contribute less
than K(H) is the union of the sets in H whose members contribute less than K(H) − 1/n for
n = 1,2,..., and as the countable union of null-sets, this set has zero measure. Hence, the budget
balancedness implies that set of those incurring the cost higher than K(H) has zero measure as well.
Finally, Assumption A.6 guarantees that every t ∈ X contributes K(H), implying that the only
δ∗-secession-proof allocation is Rawlsian.2
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